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RIGHTS OF CREDITORS AGAINST ESTATE IN ENTIRETY 105
RIGHTS OF A HUSBAND'S OR WIFE'S INDIVIDUAL
CREDITOR AGAINST AN ESTATE BY ENTIRETY.
Although under the common law no question was probably
more settled than that of an estate by entirety, under the re-
cent Married Women's Acts and various State statutes deal-
ing with husband and wife, a confusion has been brought about
at present which is due not only to the peculiarities of the
specific statutes but also to a conflict in the authorities. This
conflict is particularly noticeable in relation to the standing
of an individual creditor of the husband (or wife) toward the
estate by entirety. Space requires that this specific point in
regard to an estate by entirety be dealt with principally in this
article. The law as it stands in England will not be referred
to, and the decisions of the various American States can at the
most be only hurriedly passed over.
Alabama,' Maine 2 and South Carolina 3 have abolished the
estate by entirety. In Wisconsin 4 and Minnesota 5 the inten-
tion to create an estate by entirety must be declared in the
deed or grant. New York and New Jersey while still retaining
the right of survivorship, recognize husband and wife as ten-
ants in common only during coverture. Hiles v. Fisher,6 a New
York case, holds that either the estate by entirety and its
rents and profits are held by, and can be disposed of and
charged by the husband and wife jointly, and not by either
party individually, under the Married Women's Acts; or the
parties become tenants in common with the right of survivor-
ship, entitled during coverture to half the rents and profits
each. The Court held that the latter view conforms more
nearly to the intent of the legislature, and cites the case of
1. Donegan v. Donegan. 103 Ala. 488.
2. Robinson, Apellant, 88 Me. 17.
3. Green v. Cannady, 77 S. C. 193.
4. Bassler v. Rewodlinski, 130 Wis. 26.
5. Wilson v. Wilson, 43 Minn. 398.
6. 144 N. Y. 306, 30 L. R. A. 305.
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Buttlar v. Rosenblath,7 a New Jersey decision. However, in
Servis v. Dorn,8 where the plaintiffs were permitted to fore-
close a mortgage given on an estate by entirety by husband
and wife jointly, a judgment creditor of the husband was
made co-defendant, and the Court held that the judgments
were liens against the husband's interest in the land; that un-
der the Married Women's Acts, the wife is entitled to her
share of the usufruct, but that the husband can incumber his
part voluntarily or involuntarily; and that the surplus from
the foreclosure must be paid into court by the mortgagee to
be held until either the husband or wife died. If the husband
died first, the wife was to get the money freed from any lien;
if the wife died first, the judgment creditor was entitled to
have it applied on his judgment to satisfy his lien against the
husband's right of survivorship. Under the Buttlar case, it
Would seem that the wife was entitled to at least the interest
on half the money during her life. Even if the money was to
stand in the place of the land sold, as the Court contends, this
result should follow if the wife is a tenant in common.
In Ohio,0 Nebraska ° and Connecticut" the estate by en-
tirety has been judicially repudiated. In other States, the
Courts have on perfectly logical grounds gone so far as to
hold that the Married Women's Acts do not apply to, or affect,
an estate by entirety. This result is generally put on the
ground that the Acts affect only the separate property of the
feme covert, and her interest in an estate by entirety cannot be
called her separate and sole property. The cases in Michigan
are not in harmony. Morrill v. Morrill 2 holds that the Mar-
ried Women's Acts do not deprive the husband of the rents
and profits during coverture, to the exclusion of the wife. The
grounds which this case is decided on are very unsatisfactory
7. 42 N. J. Eq. 65, 59 Am. Rep. 52.
8. 76 N. J. Eq. 241.
9. Miles v. Fisher, 10 Ohio 1; Wilson v. Fleming, 13 Ohio 68.
10. Kerner v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 663.
11. Wlittlesey v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 337.
12. 138 Mich. 112.
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:and, although the opinion attempts to reconcile the decision
with Dickey v. Converse,la a prior decision of the same Court,
the two cases are apparently in conflict. This latter case held
that no interest in an estate by entirety in crops existed
-against which the husband's creditors wuld take out execu-
tion. And Sehliess v. Thayer et al.,14 holds that property held
by husband and wife as tenants by entirety before, or at the
time of the incurrence of a debt by the husband, is not subject
to the debt; although if the husband uses his owvn assets in
payment for an estate by entirety after incurring a debt, the
,estate is liable to the amount of the assets - so used. This de-
cision does not seem quite reconcilable with Morrill -7. Mor-
rill and, impliedly at least, seems to question the exclusive
right of the husband to the rents and profits of an estate by
entirety. If the husband has aa exclusive right to the entire
rents and profits of the estate by entirety, his creditors should
certainly be able to seize that interest.
In Pray v. Stebbins15 the Court held that the Married
Women's Acts do not affect in Massachusetts an estate by en-
tirety, because if a woman was held capable of holding an es-
tate by entirety "as if she were sole," the nature of the
estate would be destroyed. Not only does the Qourt appear to
strain the language of the statute, but it also fails to dis-
tinguish between the unity of estate and the husband's marital
rights during coverture. The object of the legislature ap-
pears to have been not to destroy the inherent unity of the es-
tate by entirety, but simply to take away the husband's right
during coverture to the rents and profits of his wife's real
estate. In Massachusetts at present the estate by entirety has
been changed by statute to an estate in common.1
An early case in Missouri, Hall v. Stephens,'7 which al-
lowed a judgment creditor of the husband to take the entire
13. 117 Mich. 449.
14. 170 Mich. 395.
15. 141 Mass. 219.
16. Pease v. Inhabitants of Whitman, 182 Mass. 363.
17. 65 Mo. 670.
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estate subject to the wife's right of survivorship, declared
that the Married Women's Acts did not apply to, or affect, an
estate by entirety. However, this declaration of the Court
appears to have been dicta as the effect of the Married Wo-
men's Acts was not before the Court. Brewing Company v.
Saxy,'8 a 1920 case in which the opinion was handed down by
Judge Roy, declares this ruling of Hall v. Stephens to have
been mere dicta and overrules it. The Brewing Company
case holds that the judgment creditor of the husband or of the
wife has no right or interest whatsoever in an estate by en-
tirety. The case holds that it was the marital right of the
husband alone that gave him the right to appropriate the rents
and profits of his wife during coverture, and this right has
been removed by statute. Independent of the marital riglit
the husband has no interest in his wife's property that he
can dispose of or that is vendible under execution. It follows
therefore, that as neither party to an estate by entirety can
dispose of or incumber it without the consent of the other par-
ty, neither can the judgment creditor of an individual party
do so, as the creditor can have no greater right than his
debtor. The husband's marital right during coverture to the
rents and profits of his wife's estate was based on the idea that
she merged in him, and not on the idea of equality which char-
acterizes the estate by entirety. In accord is Goldberg v.
Taylor, " a Missouri Appellate decision which holds that a
mechanic's lien against the husband is not enforceable against
an estate by entirety. This case and the Brewing Company
case directly overrule Hall v. Stephens and Brockett v. Lo-
gan,2 0 a more recent case in accord with it.
An early Vermont case, Corinth v. Emery,2 ' appears to be
in accord with Brewing Co. v. Saxy, supra. There is re-
spectable authority holding that this case was overruled by
18. 273 Mo. 159.
19. 237 S. W. 900.
20. 187 Mo. App. 322.
21. 65 Vt. 505.
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Laird v. Perr. 22 It is true that the Laird case arrives at a
directly opposite conclusion from Corinth v. Emery, but in
the meantime the statute mentioned in the latter had been re-
pealed and a different one enacted. Laird v. Perry does not
declare Corinth v. Emery overruled, but bases its decision
upon the grounds that under the later statute the wife's in-
terest in an estate by entirety is not included in the exemption
of her property from the marital rights of the husband. The
case seems to hold that the wife's interest in an estate by en-
tirety is not her sole property. Strictly speaking, it is not
her sole property for she holds it in unity with her husband.
Both own the entire estate. There are no moieties. Never-
theless, the wife possesses an interest which, like her other
property, is subject, as far as rents and profits are concerned,
to her husband's rights at common law. The object of the
legislature in passing the Married Women's Acts was mani-
festly to place a woman on an equal footing with her husband
as far as property rights were concerned. The legislature in-
tended to free her property from the control of her husband.
In most States the wife's interest in an estate by entirety is
not specifically excluded from the operation of the statute and
can only be so excluded by holding that it does not come with-
in the letter of the statute. It is true that courts will not
make a statute for the legislature, but where a case is mani-
festly within the intention of the legislature, the courts will
not withhold it from the effect of the statute, and this is much
more so especially when the case is only impliedly excluded
from the statute.
23
The courts of Tennessee in Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier 24 held
that the husband, under the Married Women's Acts, has no
longer the right to the rents and profits of his wife's property
during coverture and therefore her interest cannot be taken
in execution by his judgment creditors. However, the Court
held that the husband's right of survivorship is salable un-
22. 74 Vt. 454.
23. State ex rel Sheehan, 269 Mo. 421; Lincoln U. v. Hackmann, State
Auditor, 243 S. W. (Mo.) 320.
24. 95 Tenn. 115, 30 L. R. A. 315.
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der an execution against him; and if the husband survived the
wife, the purchaser at the execution sale would come into the
entire estate. Simpson v. Biffle24 is, in accord with the Ten-
nessee case as would seem to be Servis v. Dorn, supra.20 If
neither party to an estate by entirety can incumber or convey
it without the other party joining, it is difficult to see how a
creditor can have superior rights.
The Tennessee doctrine is repudiated in Jordan v. Rey-
nolds, 27 which holds that to allow a judgment against the hus-
band to be a lien against even his right of survivorship in an.
estate by eutirety or allow execution on that right, would be
an enckan.brance on the estate of the wife in that it might
defeat a sale by her and her husband, if he survived her.
This possibility would tend to hinder a sale of the property
and thus substantially deprive the wife of the use of her
property.
In Re Estate of Meyer, Weiss v. Beihl et al.,28 the Penn-
sylvania Court implies that the trustee in bankruptcy would
succeed to the husband's right of survivorship, although the
husband no longer has the right to the rents and profits of his
wife's estate. This implication is decidedly repudiated in
Beihl v. Martin.28  This latter case holds that the bare ex-
pectancy of survivorship is too remote to be the subject of ex-
ecution and that, besides, the husband or the wife cannot even
convey their right of survivorship without the joining of the
other party. Therefore, it cannot be taken involuntarily by a
claimant against only one of the parties. The case further
states that as the right of survivorship is a vested interest, a
lien may attach against it, but this lien is immediately di-
vested by a conveyance of husband and wife. The weight of
authority seems to be against any such juggling with liens. A
peculiar Pennsylvania case of earlier date which Beibl v.
25. 63 Ark. 289.
26. 76 N. J. Eq. 241.
27. 105 Md. 258, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1026.
28. 232 Pa. 89, 36 L. R. A. (N. S) 205
29. 236 Pa. 519, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 555.
110
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Martin attempts to reconcile, is Fleick v. Zillhaver,30 which
came to the astounding conclusion that a prior judgment lien
against the husband took precedence, since the husband had
survived the wife, over a subsequent mortgage executed by
husband and wife. The Court states that if the wife had sur-
vived, the mortgage would have taken precedence over the
lien.
Bruce v. Nicholson 31 holds that the North Carolina code
intended a lien to attach only to some existing legal or equita-
ble estate which could be disposed of at the time it attached.
Therefore a lien was held not to attach to the husband's right
of survivorship in an estate by entirety.
A note to Beihl et al. v. Martin, supra, in 42 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 555, says that the weight of authority and better reasoning
is against the right to obtain a lien against an estate by en-
tirety, or any right therein, without the consent of both par-
ties, where the Married Women's Acts prevail.
32
The effect of the Married Women's Acts in regard to a
judgment creditor seems excellently summed up in a note in
9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1026: "The effect on estates by entirety of
the laws enacted in the various States which give to married
women the right of possession and enjoyment of their prop-
erty is a matter of much conflict among the courts. The weight
of authority founded as we think on the better reasoning is
that such acts do not in any way affect estates by entirety ex-
cept that they deprive the husband of the right to the posses-
sion and enjoyment of the property held by himself and wife
in this manner, to the exclusion of the wife. Such acts have
the effect of freeing the wife's property from any liability to
his creditors; and therefore her right to the possession and
enjoyment of property held in common with her husband by
entirety cannot in any way be interfered with by his creditors
and hence the entire property during their joint lives is free
30. 117 Pa. 213.
31. 109 N. C. 202.
32. Bank v. McEwen, 76 S. E. 222; Healey Ice Mach. Co. v. Green, 181
Fed. 890; Hood v. Mercer, 150 N. C. 699; Sharp v. Baker, 96 N. . (Ind.) 627.
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from judgment or execution liens directed against either of
them.'"3'
When once it is determined that the general rule of com-
mon law giving the husband a right to the rents and profits of
his wife's estate during coverture, is superseded by the Mar-
ried Women's Acts; and the true nature of an estate by en-
tirety is considered; the Missouri rule as laid down in Brew-
ing Co. v. Saxy, supra, appears to be the most reasonable and
logical. Since the parties are each seized of the whole and not
of moieties, and neither can convey or incumber the estate in
any manner whatsoever without the other party joining;
which is a result of the fiction that man and wife are one; there
seems to be no equitable reason to give a creditor special
rights possessed by neither party individually. A creditor has
the ability to investigate the title to property and as long as
the estate has not been created in fraud of his rights, he can-
not complain of his failure to look up the title. If he is vigi-
lant he will deal with both parties jointly and if he fails to
do so that is no reason to prejudice the rights of the other
party. If he is a judgment creditor as the result of one
party's tort, why should the wrong of one be inflicted on both?
It is better to inflict it on neither than to make an innocent
party suffer.
The estate by entirety, like the homestead estate, tends to
protect one spouse from the improper actions of the other.
A strict enforcement of the principles on which the estate is
founded does no injustice to a creditor or lienholder and is a
valuable safeguard to the marriage relation. Rather than de-
stroy the foundation of the estate by entirety by judicial legis-
lation it is better, "when one of two innocent parties must
suffer;" to let the loss fall on the least vigilant, for if the
creditor knows of the condition of the title when the relation
arises, he has created the relation with open eyes and cannot
complain. If he does not know he has no greater equity than
the innocent party to the estate.
IRVING L. SrmwmE. '24.
33. Notes to 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 555, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 205; 30 L. R. A. 31.
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